There could be a kind of thought K 1, such that if a thought T is of that kind, then T can only be false due to mispredication; thoughts of kind K 1 are thus immune to error through misidentification. Coliva (2008) objects that judgments cannot rationalize self-attributions of belief in the way the reasons theorist contends, because they are not suitably accessible. On this basis, Rosenthal (2004) proceeds to develop an account of self-consciousness in terms of purely intellectual thoughts about oneself (more specifically, thoughts that are entertained in the presence of their object or referent). The First Person and Others. But my thoughts being self-conscious does not involve my thoughts being conscious of its self, since (i) it does not have a self, and (ii) thoughts are not the kind of thing that can be conscious of anything.
Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. (To take an example from Wittgenstein, suppose I see in the mirror a tangle of arms and I mistakenly take the nicest one to be mine. They simply aim to explain the provenance of privileged self-attributions, by identifying processes that could generate self-attributions with the epistemic features characteristic of self-knowledge. Others argue that self-knowledge can be privileged even if it rests on inference (Dretske 1994; Byrne 2005). He expected self-consciousness to involve some sort of direct encounter with the self. Although the nature of the social Other is influenced by the society's social constructs ( social class, sex, gender as a human organisation, society holds the power (social and political) to formally change the social relation between the male-defined Self and Woman, the non-male Other. (m/essay/descartes-view-real) When a sentient being acknowledges that they exist in a world of physical objects, they also confirm that their sense perception functions to an extent which allows them to reason, even to a small degree, their physical existence. It proposes that a single mindreading system detects both ones own mental states and the mental states of others. 3 4, the condition and quality.
What he expected to catch is a self-substance (if you please). A crucial problem for the theory of introspection is to fix its range of reliability. They are five: (a) State self-consciousness versus creature self-consciousness (b) Strong versus weak self-consciousness (c) Transitive versus intransitive self-consciousness (d) Consciousness of self-as-object versus consciousness of self-as-subject (e) Consciousness of self-as-author versus consciousness of self-as-owner As I warned at the opening, these distinctions are meant. I am the subject of the thought, its object is Budapest.